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Abstract 
This paper analyzes how the frictions in the labor market simultaneously affect the economic growth and 
the long run unemployment. To this goal, we develop a schumpeterian model of endogenous growth: 
agents have the choice between employment and R&D activities. Unemployment is caused by the wage-
setting behavior of unions. We show that: (i) Increases in the labor costs or in the power of trade unions 
lead to higher unemployment and lower economic growth. (ii) Efficient bargain allows to increase 
employment, at the price of a lower growth rate. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the 
insights from our empirical analysis based on 183 European Regions, between 1980-2003. 
JEL Classification: E24, J51, O33, O4, O52. 
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1. Introduction 
The observed high unemployment in continental Europe and the slowdown in 
economic growth in the last decades naturally raise the question of whether these two 
phenomena are related. On the empirical side, there is no consensus regarding the sign 
of the correlation between growth and unemployment, either across countries or over 
time within a country.
4 The same is true on the theoretical side.
5 Nevertheless, the 
endogenous growth theory predicts that distortions due to fiscal instruments lead to a 
lower growth whereas the equilibrium unemployment theory predicts that these 
distortions lead to a higher unemployment rate. This suggests that economic growth and 
long-run unemployment are linked through the labor market institutions. 
In this paper we investigate the issue of the long run link between growth and 
unemployment at two levels. First, we construct a theoretical economy to study the role 
of labor-market variables on the bad performance of European regions. The three main 
hypotheses of our model are the following: (i) Innovations are the engine of growth. (ii) 
Agents have the choice of being employed or being trying their hand at R&D. (iii) 
Unemployment is largely caused both by the wage-setting behavior of unions, and by 
                                                 
1 GAINS-TEPP (Université du Maine) & Cepremap 
2 GAINS-TEPP (Université du Maine) & Paris School of Economics & IZA 
3 Universidad de Guanajuato 
4 See Mortensen (2005) for a wide review of the empirical literature, which shows the diversity of results 
regarding the correlation between growth and unemployment. 
5 This is due to the offsetting nature of two main effects: a higher rate of growth in productivity will 
reduce unemployment trough a positive “capitalization" effect on investment in job creation; whereas 
the “creative destruction effect", inherent to the growth process, leads to a faster obsolescence of 
technologies and so to a faster rate of job destruction.  
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the labor costs associated to the tax/benefit system.
6 Second, at the light of this model, 
we explore the growth and unemployment experiences across 183 European regions. 
The observed heterogeneity is so large that it is difficult to distinguish some relation 
between these two variables, relation that is often found at national level. Hence, we try 
to recover a link through the expected effects of several institutions present on the labor 
market. To this end, we assess the effect of institutions on the (regional) growth and 
unemployment rates.
7 
The key implications of the theoretical model are the following. First, the 
bargaining power of unions, the unemployment compensation, the taxes on labor and 
the employment protection have a positive effect on unemployment and a negative 
effect on the economic growth. Second, a more coordinated bargaining process 
increases employment, at the price of a lower economic growth. The first result clearly 
contrast with the results of Lingens (2003) or Mortensen (2005): Lingens (2003) treats 
the impact of unions in a model with two kind of skills, and shows that the bargain over 
the low-skilled labor wage causes unemployment but the growth effect is ambiguous. 
Similarly, in a matching model of schumpeterian growth, Mortensen (2005) finds a 
negative effect of labor market policy on unemployment, but an ambiguous effect on 
growth. 
On the other side, the main insights from the empirical exercise are twofold. First, 
the tax wedge and the unemployment benefits are positively correlated with the regional 
unemployment rates. Conversely, the employment protection and the level of 
coordination in the wage bargaining process are negatively correlated with the regional 
unemployment rates. Second, the tax wedge and the unemployment benefits are 
negatively correlated with the regional growth rates of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita. Conversely, more coordination in the wage bargaining process is 
associated to lower regional growth rates. This points to the existence of a trade-off 
between unemployment and growth, if we focus on the impact of coordination in the 
wage bargaining process. 
These results are in accordance with the Daveri and Tabellini (2000)’ results, who 
using aggregate (national) data, find that most continental European countries exhibit a 
strong positive correlation between the unemployment rate and both, the effective tax 
rate on labor income and the average replacement rate. Conversely, they find a strong 
negative correlation between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the tax on labor 
income, either over time and across countries. 
                                                 
6 The two first hypotheses are the same as those of Aghion and Howitt (1994). As in their model, there is 
some unemployment due to the creative destruction process. However, job creations and job 
destructions occur simultaneously. 
7 The originality of this approach is to take into account the large heterogeneity between regions among a 
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2. The model economy 
In this section we develop a theoretical model to study the equilibrium link of 
economic growth and the long run unemployment at the light of the labor market 
institutions.
8 
2.1  Preferences 
The economy is populated by L identical agents, each endowed with one unit 
flow of labor. At each time, they may be employed (x), trying their hand at R&D (n) or 
unemployed (u):  L=x+n+u. Employed agents pay a tax τw on their labor income 
whereas unemployed agents receive the unemployment benefits B. 
All agents have the same linear preferences over lifetime consumption of a single 
final good:  
 
∫
∞
− =
0
) ( dt e C C U
t
t t
ρ           ( 1 )  
 
where  ϱ>0 is the subjective rate of time preference and Ct is the per capita 
consumption of the final good at time t. Each household is free to borrow and lend at 
interest rate rt. However, given linear preferences, the optimal agent’s behavior implies 
ρ=rt ∀t. Hence, the level of consumption is undefined. A standard solution to this 
problem is to assume that agents consume all their wage income. This assumption 
allows us to analyze the impact of several labor market policies. 
2.2  Goods sector 
The final good is produced by perfectly competitive firms that use the latest 
vintage (ν) of a continuum of intermediate inputs xj,  
 
         ( 2 )  
 
Aj represents the productivity of the intermediate good j and is determined by the 
number of technical improvements realized up to date t, knowing that between two 
consecutive innovations the gain in productivity is equal to q>1 (Aν+1=qAν). In turn, 
                                                 
8 This economy can be thought off either as a region or as a country.  
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intermediate goods are produced by monopolistic firms. Production of one unit of 
intermediate good requires one unit of labor as input. 
2.3  R&D sector 
Technology improvements lead to good-specific public knowledge allowing to 
start improvement efforts upon the current vintage ν. Innovations on good j arrive 
randomly at a Poisson rate hnj, where nj is the amount of labor used in R&D, and h>0 a 
parameter indicating the productivity of the research technology. Finally, the size of the 
R&D sector is given by the arbitrage condition:
9  
 
       ( 3 )  
 
That is, the opportunity cost of R&D is the hourly net wage prevailing in industry 
j,  , times the expected duration of the innovation process, 1/h.
10 On 
the other hand, the expected payoff of next innovation,  , is equal to the net 
discounted value of an asset yielding   per period until the arrival of next 
innovation, at the arrival rate  . 
We assume that the employment protection laws imply a cost E (a firing tax) of 
shutting down a firm, which occurs as current producers are replaced by next ones. 
Then:  
 
        ( 4 )  
 
Assuming that Firms pay a proportional payroll tax τ over employment, the 
instantaneous monopolistic profits earned by the successful innovator are:  
 
      (5) 
 
                                                 
9 Equivalently, the entry condition also reflects the fact that labor can be freely allocated between 
production and research: Errore. is the net value of an hour in production while Errore. is the expected 
value of an hour in research. 
10 Equivalently, we can assume that the opportunity cost is worth to the unemployment benefits, or even 
to a linear combination of the earnings of both, employed and unemployed agents. Stéphane Adjemian, François Langot, Coralia Quintero-Rojas, How do Labor Market Institutions affect 
the Link between Growth and Unemployment: the case of the European countries 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
351
Since the final-good sector is perfectly competitive, the price intermediate good j 
of vintage ν,  , is equal to its marginal product:  
 
         ( 6 )  
 
Then, after normalization of last expressions by the productivity level associated 
to the (ν+1)th innovation, we obtain:  
 
        ( 7 )  
 
Hence the free entry (3) condition becomes:  
       ( 8 )  
. 
2.4  Government 
The government faces the following budget constraint:  
 
     (9) 
 
Any change in the revenue caused by changes in taxes and subsidies is rebated to 
household through the lump-sum transfer T. 
2.5  Wage bargaining and labor demand 
The wage rate is the solution to the bargaining problem between the monopolistic 
producer of good j and the trade union representing the workers’ interests. We model 
the bargaining process as a a generalized Nash bargaining game, with union’s relative 
bargaining power 0<β<1. In case of disagreement, workers get the unemployment 
benefits and the monopolist pays the firing costs E. Given the bargained wages, the 
monopolistic producer chooses the level of employment that maximizes her profit flow. 
That is,  
  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
352 
() () ( ) [ ] ( ) { }
β
ν ν ν
β
ν ν ν ν π τ
−
+ + + + + + + − − Π − − =
1
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 max arg j j j j j j
w
j E hn W x B W W  (10) 
 
 is the firm’s disagreement point. 
2.6  Equilibrium 
Given ϱ>0, for all intermediate good sector j and for all vintage ν a steady-state 
(or balanced growth path) equilibrium is defined as follows:  
Wage rule:  
         ( 1 1 )  
for   
 
(ii)  Labor demand:  
         ( 1 2 )  
 
(iii)   R&D 
  Symmetry on wages, and so on labor demand, implies identical expected gains 
across industries from an innovation: Vj'=Vj ∀j,j'∈[0,1]. In consequence, the amount of 
labor allocated to R&D is the same for any intermediate good j: nj=n. Then, from the 
free entry condition we deduce:  
 
         ( 1 3 )  
 
where  
 
         ( 1 4 )  
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 Unemployment u is deduced from the employment identity given the 
endowment of labor L, the labor demand for production x and the aggregate number of 
potential innovators n: 
 
u=L−x−n           ( 1 5 )  
 
(v) Government: 
  The balanced budget of government is: 
bu+ٹ=(τ+τw)wx+ehn          ( 1 6 )  
were , and  .  
 
(vi) Economic growth: 
  Between two consecutive innovations final output is augmented a fixed amount 
q: Cν+1=qCν. Then, between date t and date t+1 expected output is:  
   
By taking logarithms and arranging terms we get:  
  gt≡E[lnCt+1−lnCt]=hntln(q) 
Then, at the steady state (nt=n):  
g=hnln(q)            ( 1 7 )  
 
2.7 The impact of labor market institutions on growth and unemployment 
2.7.1 Labor market policies 
In this section we analyze the consequences for growth and unemployment of, (ii) 
a more generous unemployment insurance, (ii) higher taxes on labor incomes, and (iii) 
the employment protection. As is common in the literature, this later is modeled as a 
cost of terminating the employment of workers at the end of a product’s life. This can 
be viewed as a firing tax. 
Proposition 1. An increase in the unemployment compensation (b), or in the 
payroll taxes (τ), or in the taxes on labor income (τw) or in the employment protection 
(e), leads to (i) higher unemployment and (ii) lower rate of growth.   
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This result is very intuitive (see the proof in the appendix): higher labor costs 
imply higher wages (equation (11)) and so a decline in the labor demand (equation (12)). 
This reduce the monopolistic profits and so the expected value of an innovation. 
Moreover, the higher wages make production more attractive than R&D. As the size of 
the R&D sector declines, the growth rate falls. Since neither the wage rate nor the labor 
demand change, the only effect is a contraction of profits. This reduces the agents’ 
incentives to engage in R&D. Then the growth rate falls and the unemployment 
increases. 
2.7.2  The wage bargaining processes 
The impact of unions is analyzed at two levels. First, we derive the implications of 
a higher bargaining power in the case of uncoordinated wage bargain. Second, we 
compare the outcome from an efficient bargaining process (that is, with simultaneous 
bargain of wages and labor demand) with the inefficient outcome computed above. 
The bargaining power 
Proposition 2. An increase in the unions’ bargaining power leads to an increase 
in the unemployment level and to a decrease in the economic growth.  
The economic intuition is the following (see the proof in the appendix): a bigger 
bargaining power implies higher wages. Then the labor demand for production declines, 
this lowers the monopolistic profits and so the expected value of an innovation. This 
discourages workers from engaging in R&D. The total outcome is higher 
unemployment and lower economic growth. 
Uncoordinated vs. efficient bargain 
If the monopolistic firm and the trade union in each industry bargain over either 
labor demand and wages, the outcome is said to be efficient since all externalities are 
taken into account during the bargain. Formally, the wage and firm size pairs solve (we 
add a subindex E to denote the efficient outcomes):  
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w E
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j e hn x b w x w  (18) 
 
The disagreement point and the instantaneous profit flow are respectively:  
  ̄πv+1  ≡  −hnv+1e 
 
Then at equilibrium, for all j and for all vintage v:  
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 (19)    
 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
(22) 
 
Proposition 3. Under efficient bargaining, employment is higher but the 
economic growth is lower than under uncoordinated bargaining. However, the 
comparison is ambiguous for unemployment.  
The gain in employment is due to the coordination in the setting of wages and 
labor demand for production. The decreasing returns to research and the unchanged 
opportunity cost of R&D explain why economic growth is lower under efficient 
bargaining (see the proof in the appendix). 
3. Empirical Analysis 
The observed high unemployment in continental Europe and the slowdown in 
economic growth in lasts decades naturally raised the question of whether these two 
phenomena are related. On the empirical side, no consensus was found regarding the 
sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment, either across countries or 
over time within a country. 
Whereas the institutions causing elevate labor costs are accepted in the empirical 
literature as the primary cause for high unemployment (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), 
or for low hours worked and/or low participation in European countries (Kaitila, 2006), 
the statistical relation between unemployment-causing variables and long run economic 
growth is a moot point. For instance, Layard and Nickell (1999) and Kaitila (2006) show 
that the link between unemployment-causing variables and TFP growth is weak or 
nonexistent. Conversely, Daveri et al. (2000) or Alonso et al. (2004) report a negative 
significant impact of these labor market institution variables on the growth rate of a 
large panel of OECD countries. These empirical findings constitute an interesting point 
to be investigated deeply. With this aim, in this section we explore the growth and 
unemployment experiences across European countries at a regional level as well as the 
impact of the national labor market institutions on these variables. In particular, we try 
to identify the sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment via  the 
correlation of each variable with some indicators of the labor market institutions. 
Even if we find interesting results at the regional level that are in accordance with 
the previous results at national level, it is important to note that some other interesting 
institutional features are left for future research. That is the case, for instance, the  
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increasing labor market segmentation observed in many developed countries.
11 It would 
be interesting, for instance, to assess the impact on growth and unemployment of 
having temporary contracts (rescinded at not cost) and permanent contracts (which are 
costly to revoke).
12 
3.1  The data 
Disaggregated data come from the Eurostat European Regional Database 
(Summer 2006, NUTS 2 regions).
13 
The selection criterion of regions was the availability of data for the 1980-2003 
period.
14 So, we end with 183 regions belonging to 13 countries: Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE) and the United Kingdom 
(UK). The disaggregated data we use come from the Eurostat European Regional Database 
(2005). 
Concerning the labor market institution indicators, we use the data provided by 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000): Tax wedge (TW), Unemployment benefits (UB), 
Employment protection (EP), Coordination (CO), Active labor market policies (ActPol) 
and Collective bargaining coverage (CbC). 
3.2  Growth and unemployment at a regional level: a descriptive analysis 
To shed some light on the relation between the growth rate of the regional Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and the regional unemployment rate, we estimate 
the joint density of these two variables (figure 1), but we do not find a clear relation 
between them. 
Nevertheless, the joint distribution of the growth rate of Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP) with both, the growth rate of GDP per capita (figure 2), and the unemployment 
rate (figure 3) suggest an interesting result. The correlation between the growth of the 
TFP and the growth of the GDP per capita is clearly positive, whereas the correlation 
between the growth of the TFP and the unemployment rate is negative. Hence, the 
regional development, as measured by the growth of TFP, is associated to more output 
per capita and to less unemployment. But in the latter case, the negative relationship is 
not strong enough to put in evidence a clear link between GDP growth and 
unemployment. 
                                                 
11 See for example Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Albrech and Vroman (2002) or Cheron, Langot and 
Moreno-Galbis (2010). 
12 Some previous works on this issue are the following. Models of segmented labor markets: Blanchard 
and Landier (2002); effects of firing policy: Alvarez and Veracierto (2006); labor market protection in 
search and matching models: Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). 
13 The Statistical regions of Europe correspond to the second level of the Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS 2 regions). The average size of the regions in this category is between 800 
000 and 3 million. Details on this classification can be found at European Union’s web site: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts 
14 In particular, this ruled out Norway from the sample. Stéphane Adjemian, François Langot, Coralia Quintero-Rojas, How do Labor Market Institutions affect 
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Figure 1: GDP per capita growth and unemployment rate, 1980-2003* 
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Joint distribution. The contour plots correspond to the kernel (non-parametric) estimator of the bivariate 
density. 
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Figure 2: Growth of GDP per capita and Growth of TFP (mean), 1980–1995*. 
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Figure 3: Unemployment rates and Growth of TFP (mean), 1980–1995*. 
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3.3  Recovering the missing link: an econometric analysis 
At a disaggregated level, the GDP per capita growth and the unemployment rate 
seem to be very weakly related. According to Daveri and Tabellini (2000), the relation 
between these two variables at the national level has mainly to be explained by common 
job-market-related national policies, and more precisely by taxes on wages. In this 
section we propose a formal statistical test allowing to evaluate the impact of national 
labor market institutions (taxes on wages, union density, unemployment benefits, 
employment protection, etc...) on the regional GDP per capita growth and the regional 
unemployment rates. 
The specificity of each European region is accounted by the mean growth rate of 
its Solow residual, which is computed assuming that the technology in each region is 
Cobb-Douglas.
15 Since this exercise intends simply to look for possible correlations 
between the variables, we are not dealing at this level with identification or endogeneity 
problems. Instead, the issue of causality is treated in the theoretical economy developed 
earlier in the paper. Nevertheless, matter of robustness, in appendix Errore. L'origine 
riferimento non è stata trovata. we consider two alternative indicators to the TFP for 
the specific technology available in a region: the growth rates of the regional capital 
share (Kj) and the regional employment on the energy and manufacturing sector (Ee&m,j
).
16 
                                                 
15 The theoretical model can be viewed as a regional economy with specific innovation process. 
16 A better indicator would be the share of employment in the industrial sector, but we don’t have data on 
this variable. Stéphane Adjemian, François Langot, Coralia Quintero-Rojas, How do Labor Market Institutions affect 
the Link between Growth and Unemployment: the case of the European countries 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
359
3.3.1  Empirical models 
Let Xc be a 1×k vector gathering the policy variables of country c=1,…,C. Each 
country c is divided in Nc regions  c N i , , 1K =  and we define  ∑ = =
C
c c N N
1  as the total 
number of European regions in our sample. Let c be a mapping from the regional 
indexes to the national indexes:  
 
 
 
The empirical models are defined by the following equations:  
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ε γ β α
ε γ β α
+ + Χ + =
+ + Χ + =
        ( 2 3 )  
 
where  gj and uj are respectively the growth rate of GDP per capita and the 
unemployment rate (averages) of region j,  αg and αu are two constants that will 
eventually be replaced by the following set of dummy variables: dum1: DK, SE, NL, FI; 
dum2: BE, DE, FR, ES, PT, AT, IT; and dum3: IE, UK. These dummy variables regroup 
countries according to an specific socioeconomic organization (Nordic, Anglo-Saxon 
and Continental countries) which is not included in our set of explanatory variables. εg,j 
and  εu,j are two zero expectation random variables such that E [] εs,jεs,j =σ2,s, 
E [] εs,jXc(j) =0 for s=u,g and E [] εu,jεg,j =0
17. Finally, the growth rate of the Solow 
residual is denoted by SRj. 
3.3.2  Empirical strategy 
The estimation of models (23) may be done using OLS equation by equation, but 
this approach would eventually be sensitive to the existence of outliers. Figures 1, 2 and 
3 suggest that there is a number of such observations, so a more robust approach is 
needed. In order to obtain point estimates less sensible to outliers we use a median-
regression (LAD) instead of mean-regression (OLS). For instance, in the case of the 
growth equation this estimator is defined as follows:  
 
                                                 
17 Under these assumptions we can estimate (23) equation by equation.  
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() {} () ∑ − Χ − − = ≡
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 (24) 
 
we minimize the sum of the absolute values of the residuals instead of the sum of 
the squared residuals. The asymptotic distribution of this estimator is given by:  
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ε
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)
      ( 2 5 )  
 
where X is a N×(k+2) matrix gathering the constant, the set of policy variables 
and the growth rate of the Solow residual, and fε
g the density function associated to the 
error term. As a consequence, to test if a parameter significantly differs from zero we 
have first to evaluate the density of the error term at zero. To evaluate the variance of 
g
N LAD b ,
)
 we can (i) impose a parametric shape to the error term, (ii) use a nonparametric 
(kernel) estimate of the density at zero or (iii) use a bootstrap approach as described in 
Greene (2002). In what follows we consider the latter solution, which has the advantage 
over (i) and (ii) to be exact at finite distance. 
3.3.3  Results 
We estimate two regressions. In the first one the endogenous variable is the 
average growth rate of GDP per capita of each European Region (labeled Growth). In 
the second one, the endogenous variable is the average regional unemployment rate 
(labeled Unemployment). In both cases, the dependent variables are the mean values of 
our collection of labor market indicators, as well as the average growth rates of the 
Solow residuals.
18 Estimations are reported in table 1. 
                                                 
18 We take average values mainly because of the few observations of labor market indicators, which have a 
five-year periodicity. Moreover, this allow us to be consistent with the equilibrium framework developed 
above (endogenous growth). That theoretical framework, also explains why we are not including initial 
conditions in the regressions. Stéphane Adjemian, François Langot, Coralia Quintero-Rojas, How do Labor Market Institutions affect 
the Link between Growth and Unemployment: the case of the European countries 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
361
 Table 1: Baseline specification. 
 Growth  Unemployment 
  Β p-value  β p-value 
gTFP  0.7983 0.0000 -0.9349  0.0070 
TW  -3.0425  0.0000  5.1462  0.0250 
UB -0.5436  0.0000  2.8232  0.0000 
EP  0.4098  0.1006  -7.7997  0.0000 
CO -2.0250  0.0000  -20.453  0.0000 
ActPol  0.2215  0.0718  4.3593  0.0000 
CbC -0.2311  0.6081  0.5911  0.8058 
dum1  5.1820  0.0153  156.33  0.0000 
dum2  8.4435 0.0152 279.67 0.0000 
dum3  -1.5131  0.0179  17.819  0.0000 
Fischer  232.04 0.0000 81.07  0.0000 
R2  0.6789  –  0.3484  – 
♯ Observations  183 –  183 – 
LAD estimation. The dependent variables are annual mean GDP per capita growth rate for the Growth regression and 
mean unemployment rate for the Unemployment regression. Student and associated p-values are computed with a 
bootstrap procedure as advocated by Greene (2002).  
 
In the growth equation, excepting for the employment protection (EP), the active 
labor market policies (Actpol) and the collective bargaining coverage (CbC), all the point 
estimates significantly differ from zero at a 5% level. Finally, the positive link between 
the growth rate of TFP and the growth rate of GDP per capita, suggested by figure 2, is 
confirmed by this statistical analysis. Regarding the unemployment equation, all the 
variables have the expected signs, except the active labor market policies (ActPol) and 
are significant, except the collective bargaining coverage (CbC).  
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Summary: 
•  The tax wedge (TW) and the unemployment benefits (UB) are negatively 
correlated to the growth rates but positively correlated with the unemployment rates.  
• The coordination of the wage bargaining (CO) is negatively correlated with both 
the growth rates and the unemployment rates.  
• The TFP growth is positively correlated (negatively correlated) with the GDP 
per capita growth (unemployment rate).  
Most of the theoretical results are in accordance with our empirical findings. The 
few exceptions are:  
• Converse to the empirical insights, the theoretical model predicts an ambiguous 
link between unemployment and coordination.  
• Even if the correlation between the bargaining power and the GDP growth is 
not significant, it has the unambiguous sign predicted by our theoretical model. These 
results can be explained by the poor approximation of our statistical measure (collective 
bargaining coverage (CbC)) to the workers’ bargaining power.  
Finally, the R2 is 68% for the growth equation, and 35% for the unemployment 
equation, meaning that our collection of labor-market-related policy variables and the 
TFP growth explain more than 2/3 of the heterogeneity in growth rates and roughly 
1/3 of the heterogeneity in unemployment rates. As expected, the role of Solow 
residuals is much more important explaining growth than unemployment. 
3.3.4  Counterfactuals 
To close our empirical analysis, in this section we propose an evaluation of the 
marginal impact of both national (labor market institutions) and regional (TFP growth) 
components on the predicted growth and unemployment rates of a given European 
region. 
The methodology 
Let us consider the following experience: Assume that a Region j' in France has 
the same environment than a region j in UK excepting for one of its national specific 
variables (labor market policies) or for its specific regional variable. Using the previous 
estimations of the growth and unemployment rates we can evaluate the marginal impact 
of the national/regional specific variables. More precisely, we construct these 
counterfactual experiences as follows:  
• Predicted GDP per capita growth of Region j in UK is defined by:  
 
g UK j g UK g UK j SR c g β β
) ) ) )
, , + Χ + =         ( 2 6 )  
with  () UK UK UK UK UK UK UK CbC ActPol CO EP UB TW , , , , , ≡ Χ  
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• Suppose that Region j' in France is as Region j in UK with respect to all the 
conditioning variables except Tax Wedge. Hence Region j' in France counterfactual 
GDP per capita growth will be:  
 
g UK j g
TW
FR g
TW
FR j SR c g β β
) ) )
, ' , '
~ ~ + Χ + =         ( 2 7 )  
with  () UK UK UK UK UK FR
TW
FR CbC ActPol CO EP UB TW , , , , , ~ ≡ Χ  
 
The gap between  FR j g , '
)  and 
TW
FR j g , ' ~  gives a measure of the marginal effect of the 
French fiscal policy.  
Results 
Due to the large number of Regions (183), we focus only on typical cases. We 
take London as reference and we evaluate the marginal impact of typical European 
labor market experiences: a north continental country (France), a south continental 
country (Spain) and a Nordic country (Sweden). For the two first countries, we assess 
the marginal impacts of the explanatory variables on two regions: a highly developed 
region (“Ile de France”, which contains Paris and its surroundings, and “Madrid”) and a 
poor one (“Corsica” and “Andalusia”). 
 
Figure 4: The French case (I): London versus Paris. 
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Observed and predicted London are respectively denoted “ London” and “London”. We use the same color convention for 
Paris. The marginal effects of our explanatory variables are in soft color ( CbC, Tw, etc…). 
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Figures 4 and 5 display results for the French economy. Figure 4 shows that the 
predictions of the econometric model are close to the observed values. Point TW 
represents the prediction of the model if all the explanatory variables, except taxes, are 
the same than in London. Hence, the gap between the prediction for London and this 
point gives a measure of the marginal impact of French taxation
19. The higher 
unemployment and the lower growth in Paris than in London are mainly due to the 
higher tax wedge (TW) in France and to the lower TFP growth (gTFP) in Paris. 
Moreover, the wage bargaining coordination (CO) in France implies less unemployment 
but at the price of a lower GDP per capita growth. Figure 5 shows that the model 
predictions for Corsica are quit poor. Nevertheless, the experience for Corsica 
underlines that, beyond the national component (the high tax wedge already mentioned 
for Paris), it is the insufficient R&D investment that largely explains the lower 
performance of this Region. 
Figure 6 illustrates the case of a Nordic Region, Stockholm. Results indicate that 
the higher taxes in Sweden than in UK lead to more unemployment and to less growth. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the French region, the high TFP growth allows this Nordic 
Region to converge towards London. Moreover, since the coordination of the wage 
bargain is higher than in France, we observe a large decrease in the unemployment rate, 
whereas the impact of this labor market institution is negligible in the growth equation. 
 
Figure 5: The French case (II): London versus Corsica 
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19 The same interpretation holds for all the explanatory variables: employment protection (EP), 
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Figure 6: The Nordic case: London versus Stockholm 
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 Figure 7: The Spanish case (I): London versus Madrid 
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 Figure 8: The Spanish case (II): London versus Andalusia 
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What do we learn from the Spanish cases?  Figures 7 and 8 show that the higher 
unemployment rates are mainly due to the lower TFP growth. Moreover, the high 
growth rate of GDP per capita (equal or higher than the one observed in London) is not 
explained by a high level of technology (gTFP), but by a catch-up phenomenon. The 
poor performances (measured by the TFP growth), even in Madrid, would lead the 
Spanish government to give more incentives to invest in the R&D sector. Finally, the 
estimations also show that the labor market institutions in Spain lead to better economic 
performances than in France. 
4. Conclusion 
We have constructed a general equilibrium model in which economic growth and 
unemployment are endogenously determined by the number of innovations made in the 
economy, which in turn is determined by the agents’ incentives to engage in R&D 
activities. We have shown that increases in the labor costs or in the power of trade 
unions lead to higher unemployment and to a slowdown of the economic growth, 
whereas an efficient bargain allows to higher employment, but has an ambiguous effect 
on economic growth. 
Next we have explored if these theoretical relations are empirically supported. 
Using cross-section data of European regions and a large set of labor market variables, 
we find that national institutions on the labor market are highly correlated with 
unemployment and growth. In particular, the tax wedge and the unemployment benefits 
are positively correlated to the regional unemployment rates whereas the employment 
protection and the coordination in the bargaining process are negatively correlated to 
the regional unemployment rates. On the other hand, either the tax wedge and the Stéphane Adjemian, François Langot, Coralia Quintero-Rojas, How do Labor Market Institutions affect 
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unemployment benefits are positively correlated to the GDP per capita growth. 
Nevertheless, a high level of coordination in the bargaining process is associated with 
lower growth rates. This last points to a trade-off between unemployment and growth if 
we focus on the impact of coordination on the wage bargain. 
References 
Adjemian S., Langot F., Quintero-Rojas C. (2006), ‘Growth, Unemployment and Tax/Benefit 
system in European Countries: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations’, mimeo, Discussion 
Paper, SCS8-CT-2004-502639, European Commission, TAXBEN. 
Aghion P., Howitt P. (1994), ‘Growth and Unemployment’, Review of Economic Studies, 61, 477–
494. 
Aghion P., Howitt P. (1998), Endogenous Growth Theory. MIT. 
Albrecht J., Vroman S. (2002), ‘A matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements’, 
International Economic Review, 43, 283–305. 
Alonso A., Echeverria C., Tran K. C., (2004), ‘Long-Run Economic Performance and the Labor 
Market’, Southern Economic Journal, 70 (4), 905–919. 
Alvarez F., Veracierto M. (2006), ‘Fixed-Term Employment Contracts in an Equilibrium Search 
Model’, mimeo,  NBER Working Paper Series, 12791. 
Blanchard O., Landier A. (2002), ‘The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed–
Term Contracts in France’, Economic Journal, 112 (480), F214–F244. 
Blanchard O., Wolfers J., (2000), ‘The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of european 
unemployment: the aggregate evidence’,  Economic Journal, 110, 1–33. 
Cahuc P., Postel-Vinay F. (2002), ‘Temporary jobs, employment protection and labor market 
performance’,  Labour Economics, 9 (1), 63–91. 
Chéron A., Langot F., Moreno-Galbis E. (2010), ‘Labour Market Institutions and Technological 
Employment’, Economica, Forthcoming. 
Daveri F., Tabellini G. (2000), ‘Unemployment, growth and taxation in industrial countries’,  
Economic Policy, 15 (30), 47–104. 
Greene W. H. (2002), Econometric analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. 
Kaitila V. (2006), ‘Productivity, hours worked, and Tax/Benefit systems in Europe and beyond’, 
mimeo, Discussion Paper, SCS8-CT-2004-502639, European commission, TAXBEN. 
Layard R., Nickell S. (1999) , ‘Labor market institutions and economicperformance’, Handbook of 
Labor Economics, 3C. North-Holland, 3029–3084. 
Lingens J. (2003), ‘The impact of a unionised labor market in a Schumpeterian growth model’, 
Labour Economics, 10, 91–104. 
Mortensen D. T. (2005), ‘Growth, Unemployment and Labor Market Policy’, The Journal of the 
European Economic Association. 
Mortensen D. T., Pissarides C.A. (1999), ‘Unemployment Responses to “Skill-Biased” 
Technology Shocks: The Role of Labour Market Policy’, Economic Journal, 109 (455), 242–265. 
Ville K. (2006), ‘Productivity, hours worked, and Tax/Benefit systems in Europe and beyond’, 
mimeo, Discussion Paper, SCS8-CT-2004-502639, European comission, TAXBEN.  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
368 
Appendix A: Proofs 
Proposition 1.  a. . It is easy to show that: 
. So,  
 
In a similar way, we deduce: b.    ⇒ 
 
The first inequality comes from the fact that q>1. 
Proposition 2. Analogous to the proof of proposition 1:   and  . So, 
 and  . 
Proposition 3. It is easy to verify that  . Since β1>1, then x<xE. On 
the other hand, . But   and  , so that the comparison 
of profits (and then of the number of researchers and growth rates) seems ambiguous. 
However, even if we cannot provide a full analytical proof, our numerical computations 
for a large grill of points satisfying 0<α<1, and 0<β<1, yields in all cases  . 
Indeed, we have   where   with 
. The figure 9 shows that ∆ is always positive. We do not represent ∆ for 
α and β larger than 0.9 because ∆→∞ in this case.  
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Figure 9: Numeraical analysis of the gap π−πE 
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Appendix B:  Alternative indicators of the regional development 
The growth rates of the capital share of region j (Kj) and the employment on the 
energy and manufacturing sector of region j (Ee&m,j) are defined as follows:  
 
           ( 2 7 )  
 
          ( 2 8 )  
 
where   is the regional capital stock, and Ki is the national capital stock. 
Similarly,   and Ei are respectively the regional employment in the energy and 
manufacturing sector, and the national employment. 
B1  Empirical alternative models 
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B2  Estimations 
In the growth equation, the point estimates significantly differs from zero at a 5% 
level, and have the expected sign for the following variables: regional capital share, tax 
wedge (TW), replacement rate (UB), and coordination (CO). Concerning the 
unemployment equation, all variables have the expected sign, except ActPol (active 
labor market policies) and are significant at 5% or 10% level. In addition to the 
intuitions from the baseline specification, we find that the bargaining power is 
associated to higher unemployment. 
Finally, the R2 is respectively 44% and 28%, meaning that our collection of labor-
market-related policy variables and the growth rate of the two regional-specific variables 
explains about 1/2 of the heterogeneity of the growth rates and roughly 1/3 of the 
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Table 2: Second Specification. 
 Growth  Unemployment 
  β p-value  β p-value 
Kj  0.4487 0.0000  -1.1516  0.0001 
Ee&m,j  -0.0015  0.9138  -0.1278  0.0685 
TW -1.2368  0.0002  2.7331  0.0996 
UB  -0.1379  0.0320  2.6579  0.0000 
EP 0.0037  0.9847  -3.9600  0.0001 
CO  -1.4539  0.0000  -16.5395  0.0000 
ActPol  0.1208 0.2149  3.8073 0.0000 
CbC  0.2634  0.4732  4.0794  0.0305 
dum1 12.2149  0.0000  116.2032  0.0000 
dum2  18.8026  0.0000  213.3097  0.0000 
dum3 1.9634  0.0001  16.7360  0.0000 
Fischer  218.2335  0.0000  71.3733  0.0000 
R2  0.44314 –  0.28323 – 
♯ Observations  183  –  183  – 
LAD estimation. Student and associated p-values are computed with a bootstrap procedure as advocated by Greene (2002).  